18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9) lists category of persons who are federally prohibited from possessing firearms, but 18 U.S.C. 921(A)(20) provides that the prohibitions outlined in 18 U.S.C. 922 do not apply to persons who have had their firearms rights properly restored by the state of conviction. See U.S. v. Cassidy (6th Cir. 1990), 899 F.2d 543.
In Caron v. U.S. (1998), 524 U.S. 308, the supreme court established that a state restoration must be complete in order for that state’s restorations to qualify for the exception contained within 18 U.S.C. 921(A)(20) so that the prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9) do not apply to those who have that state’s restoration. Accordingly, citizens who have been granted a state restoration have been prosecuted federally and sent to prison for 10 years because their state’s laws did not comply with the standard in Caron v. U.S. (1998), 524 U.S. 308. Persons possessing long guns pursuant their state’s restoration were federally convicted because their state did not also restore their right to possess handguns. There is a chart containing this information for all 50 states:
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-rest ... rivileges/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;. To find the chart click on “firearms rights under federal law.” The second to the last column is “State Offenders Under No State Disability who Remain Federally Disabled.”
Lines 126 through 130 of SB 215 define a “qualifying adult” for the purposes of being able to carry a concealed handgun without a license as a person over 21 “who is not legally prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9).” Then lines 201 through 217 provide that any person “comes within any category of persons specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9)” loses their right to carry a concealed handgun without a license. Sb 215’s language in lines 201 through 217 does not take into consideration firearms rights that have been restored in direct contradiction to lines 126 through 130.
Now, apply this to a real-world circumstance where a person (Jane) who was convicted many years ago of a felony for bouncing a check. Jane lost her right to possess a firearm pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9) because the conviction was for a felony. Ohio restored that Jane’s civil rights by way of R.C. 2961.01(A)(2) and 2967.16(C)(1), and Ohio’s firearms prohibitions in R.C. 2923.13 does not apply because bouncing a check is not a felony of violence or a felony drug offense. 18 U.S.C. 921(A)(20) exempts Jane from the federal prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9) because Ohio law currently provides for complete restoration.
SB 215 passes and becomes law. Jane carries a firearm to protect herself and her young children while driving in Cleveland and is involved in a vehicle collision. Police discover that she is carrying a firearm and run a background check and find her check bouncing felony conviction, which brings her “within [a] category of persons specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9).”
And John has a 30-year-old conviction that has been sealed under Ohio law, which currently provides for complete restoration and invokes the federal exception in 18 U.S.C. 921(A)(20). He lives in Cleveland, has a CHL and owns several firearms. SB 215 passes and becomes law. John has been and continues to “come[] within any category of persons specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9).” John’s house catches on fire, and the Cleveland Fire Department discovers firearms while putting out the fire.
A federal prosecutor indicts both John and Jane to a federal judge for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Do you think a federal judge who was appointed by Barack Obama would dismiss the case or allow it to proceed after the prosecutor argues that Ohio’s restorations are not complete as described in Caron v. U.S. (1998), 524 U.S. 308, because they prohibit, without exception, persons who “come[] within any category of persons specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9)” from carrying a firearm without a CHL? I think the judge would say that there is a clear legislative intent in using the phrase “comes within any category of persons specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9)” because the legislature had already used “becomes prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9)” in lines 126 through 130 and had to have understood the difference in the meaning between the two. Appellate courts use this reasoning all the time. I think John and Jane go to prison.
All of this can be avoided very easily in reconciliation by an amendment that strikes “comes within any category of persons specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9)” from lines 202-203 and replace it with “becomes prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9).”
Next they are reconciled ??
