Subdivision (B)(6) of R.C. § 2923.126, however, turns all of that on its head if the private property in question happens to be a place of worship. It is a felony in Ohio to carry a handgun into a place of worship as a default rule unless the owner of the place of worship provides express consent.
This statutory scheme violates the U.S. Constitution in two separate and distinct ways and must be repealed.
The Second Circuit addressed these issues last Friday in four cases heard and decided in tandem. See Antonyuk; Hardaway; Christian; Spencer v. Chiumento (2nd Cir. 12/08/2023), 22-2908 (L); 22-2933; 22-2987; 22-3237 (https://www.docdroid.net/xi9FTq2/22-297 ... ents-2-pdf ):
1. In upholding a trial court’s injunction in Spencer the Second Circuit held:
2. The Second Circuit also upheld a preliminary injunction in Christian v. Nigrelli (NY Dist. 11/22/2022), 22-CV-695 (JLS) (https://casetext.com/case/christian-v-nigrelli) that enjoined a state law that prohibited the carrying of firearms onto private property unless the property owner gives express consent as “it runs afoul of the Second Amendment.” The trial court’s reasoning is as follows:If the State has determined that places of worship must be designated as sensitive places because criminal trespass law is not enough to keep out guns, then the decision to regulate places of worship more assiduously than other locations amounts to an unequal pursuit of the interest in preventing gun violence. Such an approach is understandable, but unconstitutional. * * * .
And if New York has elected to “permit[] other activities to proceed” with less stringent regulation of firearms, “it must show that the religious exercise at issue is more dangerous than those activities even when the same precautions are applied.” Id., at 168-169.
The Ohio legislature can save the taxpayers the legal expenses of almost certain forthcoming litigation by simply repealing subdivision (B)(6) of R.C. § 2923.126.The Nation's historical tradition is that individuals may carry arms on private property unless the property owner chooses otherwise. See generally D. Kopel & J. Greenlee, The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational Limits on the Right to Bear Arms, 13 Charleston L. Rev. 205, 290-91 (2018).
The State has not identified any historical tradition for its “inversion”-whereby the government now affirmatively exercises the right to exclude concealed carriers on behalf of all private property owners***.
The State posits that a self-governing society may choose one of two default rules, namely, that carrying on private property is (a) generally permitted absent the owner's prohibition, or (b) never permitted unless the owner affirmatively consents. Dkt. 33, at 15. Maybe so, but the scope of the right codified in the Second Amendment demonstrates that this society-this nation-has historically had the former default arrangement. The latter proposed default was not part of any historical tradition to the contrary, and did not form a limitation of the scope of the right so codified in the Bill of Rights. Instead, the State's current policy preference is one that, because of the interest balancing already struck by the people and enshrined in the Second Amendment, is no longer on the table. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 636; Bruen, 142 S.Ct. at 2131.